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We consider the distributed access enforcement problem for Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) systems. Such enforcement has become important with RBAC's increasing adoption, 
and the proliferation of data that needs to be protected. We provide a platform for assessing 
candidates for access enforcement in a distributed architecture for enforcement. The platform 
provides the ability to encode data structures and algorithms for enforcement, and to measure 
time-, space- and administrative efficiency. To validate our platform, we use it to compare the 
state of the art in enforcement, CPOL [6], with two other approaches, the directed graph and the 
access matrix [9, 10]. We consider encodings of RBAC sessions in each, and propose and justify 
a benchmark for the assessment. We conclude with the somewhat surprising observation that 
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 Access control deals with the provision of regulated accesses to resources by principals. 
It is one of the most important aspects of security. In Figure 1, we show how access control is 
enforced. A user wishes to perform read and write operations on a file. The user makes a request 
that is mediated by an entity called a reference monitor. The reference monitor consults an access 
control policy to make its decision. An access control policy specifies the resources to which a 
user has access. The reference monitor either allows or denies the particular action.  
 
 
Figure 1 - A Reference Monitor and its use for access enforcement. The user attempts to read and write a file. The 
reference monitor mediates both attempts and after consulting the access control policy, allows him to read the file, but 
not write it. 
 A syntax for access control policies is Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [2, 3]. RBAC 
is becoming the de-facto standard for access control in enterprise settings. In RBAC, rather than 
assigning a user directly to permissions, we assign a user to roles, and the roles to permissions. 
Also, the roles are associated with one another in a partial ordering called a role-hierarchy. An 




Figure 2 - An Example of RBAC policy. Users are shown in diamonds, roles in ovals and permissions in rectangles. Edges 
represent user-role, role-role and role-permission assignments. In the example, the user Alice is assigned to the role 
Project Manager and is therefore authorized to the permission Team Organization. She is also authorized to the role 
Developer, and therefore to Code Modification. 
. 
 We consider access enforcement in the context of RBAC. In RBAC, a user exercises 
permissions in sessions. A session is associated with a set of roles to which the user is authorized 
in the RBAC configuration. A user can create multiple sessions. In the example in Figure 2, 
users Alice and Bob may activate sessions sa and sb respectively. Alice may associate session sa 
with the role Software Engineer, which authorizes sa to the permissions Project Planning and 
Code Modification. Bob may associate sb with the roles Software Engineer and IT Consultant, 
which authorizes sb to the permissions Project Planning, Code Modification and Project Review. 
 Modern enterprises generate and archive large amounts of data. Such data needs to be 
protected by access control systems. The proliferation of data requires access control systems to 
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scale to tens of thousands of resources and permissions [1]. The time-efficiency of access 
enforcement is an important consideration for RBAC systems. The size of RBAC polices can be 
large (tens of thousands of permissions and users), and this can impact time-efficiency. For time-
efficiency, we may distribute access enforcement across several reference monitors. With such 
an approach, a single, monolithic reference monitor is no longer a performance bottleneck. Wei 
et al. [4] have proposed an architecture for such distributed enforcement (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 - An architecture, for distributed access-enforcement in RBAC, and an associated flow. The PDP is a centralized 
entity at which the RBAC policy is maintained. Enforcement is performed at a PEP. The PEP is aided by an SDP. The 
SDP can be seen as a cache of a portion of the RBAC configuration from PDP. 
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In the architecture, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a centralized entity at which the 
RBAC policy is maintained. Enforcement is performed at Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). 
PEPs are aided by Secondary Decision Points (SDPs). An SDP can be seen as a cache of a 
portion of the RBAC configuration from the PDP. In Figure 3, we show a typical chronological 
flow of events. In Step 1, a user activates a session at a PEP/SDP. In RBAC, users exercise 
permissions in sessions. A session is associated with a set of roles to which the user is authorized 
in the RBAC configuration. In the example in Figure 2, users Alice and Bob may activate 
sessions sa and sb respectively.  
The request to activate a session propagates to the PDP, which makes the decision on 
whether it is allowed. If it is, in Step 2, the PDP communicates a data structure to the SDP that 
the latter uses in Steps 3, 4 and 5 to make decisions on access requests that pertain to that 
session, that are communicated to it by the PEP.  
In adopting the architecture from Figure 3, a question that arises is: what are the data 
structure and associated algorithms we should use in an SDP, so that an access check is fast? In 
answering this question, we also need to consider other aspects that may be traded-off to achieve 
time-efficiency. Two such aspects are: 
 Space efficiency — this relates to the space that a particular data structure takes 
at the SDP. Space and time efficiency can be at odds; this is the classical time-
space trade-off.  
 Administrative efficiency — with this, we ask whether a particular data structure 
at the SDP lends itself to easy administration in the propagation of administrative 
changes that are made at the PDP, to the SDP. We quantify this as the time it 
takes to update the SDP when an administrative change is made to the RBAC 
configuration at the PDP.  
We provide a platform for assessing candidates for access enforcement in the architecture 
shown in Figure 3. The platform provides the ability to encode data structures and algorithms 
that may be used for enforcement, and to measure the time-, space- and administrative 
efficiency. 
To validate our platform, we use it to assess three approaches for the data structure at the 
SDP. They are: directed graph, access matrix [9, 10] and CPOL [6]. Apart from validating our 
platform, our intent with our assessment is to compare CPOL with two other approaches that are 
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natural candidates. CPOL is an approach to distributed access enforcement which, to our 
knowledge, is the state of the art from the standpoint of time-efficiency. The directed graph is a 
natural candidate as an RBAC policy can be perceived as a directed graph. The access matrix is a 
canonical and intuitively appealing representation for an access control policy. Consequently, we 
consider it a natural candidate as the data structure at an SDP.  
A challenge in conducting an empirical assessment is the lack of a meaningful 
benchmark. The establishment of meaningful benchmarks is seen as an important milestone in 
several settings in computing. We propose and adopt a benchmark in our work (see Chapter 4). 
Our objective is for what we propose to serve as a macro-benchmark [7] — one that has RBAC 
policies and session profiles that are realistic. 
In summary, our contribution is a platform for assessing approaches for distributed access 
enforcement in RBAC. Also, we validate its utility by assessing three approaches, one of which 
is the state of the art for access enforcement, but has not been previously used in the context of 
RBAC. The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we discuss 
related work. In Chapter 3, we describe our architecture and the three approaches that we access. 
In Chapter 4, we describe our benchmark, and present our validation. We conclude in Chapter 5, 
with a rating of each of the three approaches for time-, space- and administrative efficiency. 




2. Related Work 
 
There is large amount of research in distributed access control, and in distributed RBAC 
in particular. However, there is relatively little work on efficient access enforcement in these 
contexts. To our knowledge, CPOL [6] is the state of the art in access enforcement in distributed 
settings. CPOL employs caching and a structure called an AccessToken that is application-
specific to speed-up access enforcement. The work on CPOL points out also that simply using 
database querying does not suffice for fast access enforcement. Our work is close also to those of 
Wei et al. [4], Tripunitara and Carbunar [5] and Liu et al. [8], that address the access 
enforcement problem in RBAC. Wei et al. [4] propose the architecture that we adopt in this 
paper (see Figure 3). In that context, they propose authorization recycling which is one of the 
approaches that we assess. Liu et al. [8] propose a technique that they call transformations for 
access checking in RBAC. We see a transformation as encoding RBAC in an access matrix; it is 





    
As we state in Chapter 1, our architecture for distributed access-enforcement in RBAC 
(see Figure 3), has two components. One is the PDP which the central repository of the RBAC 
policy. We store the policy as a directed graph at the PDP. The other component is an SDP. In 
our architecture, one or more SDPs may be associated with a PDP. In the following sections, we 
discuss our design of the PDP and SDP and rationalize it. 
 
3.1. Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
 
 
Figure 4 - PDP class diagram 
 




public static RbacGraph g; 
public ArrayList<SecondaryDecisionPoint> sdp; 
 
One attribute is of type RbacGraph, which is our implementation of a directed graph as 
an adjacency list. The other is an array list of SDPs that are associated with this PDP. The 
methods associated with a PDP are as follows. 
 
public void init(FileReader fReader) throws IOException{...} 
 
We use init() to initialize the PDP with an RBAC policy from an input file. 
 
public abstract SDPDataStructure request(Session s, String[] roles); 
public abstract SDPDataStructure delete(int session_id); 
 
3.1.1. The RBAC Policy at a PDP 
 
As we mention in Section 3.1.1, the RBAC policy at a PDP is maintained as a directed 
graph.  
There are customarily two options for representing a directed graph [28]. One is as an 
adjacency matrix, and the other is as an adjacency list. We have chosen the adjacency list, as that 
lends itself to easier administration of an RBAC policy. Administration comprises changes to an 
RBAC policy, such as the addition and removal of users, the assignment and revocation of users 
to roles, and roles to other roles and permissions. The addition of a user-role relationship, for 
example, translates to the addition of an entry to a linked list in the adjacency list representation 
for a directed graph. Similarly, the removal of a role-permission relationship translates to the 
removal of an entry from a linked list. The reason why we do not care about time of checking the 
association between two vertices, is because we can assume that the PDP is of less importance 
for us, and that is run on powerful computer system, preferably fast with a lot of storage. When 
we say that the PDP is of less importance for us, we want to emphasise that the problem we are 
dealing with is more associated with the SDP than the PDP. The access checking itself is done at 
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the SDP. Only time we go to the PDP, is when we do not have that particular session on the SDP 
so we need to retrieve data from the PDP. In this case we only recalculate new structure that is to 
be sent back to the SDP.  
 
RbacGraph is a graph implemented as an adjacency list. It has array list of vertices. It is a 
direct graph with a particular structure – it is acyclic, and its vertices can be partitioned into three 
sets [14]. Vertices are: User-Vertex, Role-Vertex and Permission-Vertex. There are some 
constraints on edges between those sets, and they are explained later (Section 3.2.1). 
RbacGraph class implements RBAC class. RBAC class extends SDPDataStructure, 
which is an empty interface. The reason behind this is a need to have the same structure signature 
at any SDP. Having this implemented this way, we can implement its daughter classes in more 
elegant manner. 
 
RbacGraph class looks as follows.  
 
public class RbacGraph implements RBAC { 
 public ArrayList<Vertex> vertices; 







Figure 5 - Vertex class diagram 
In order to explain RbacGraph we have to go to a more basic unit that graph is made of. That 
unit is a vertex. Therefore we have to take a look at the Structures package which contains the 







Vertex class As we can clearly see from the Figure 7, Vertex is an abstract class. All of the 
UserVetrex, RoleVertex and PremissionVertex extend Vertex class. 
 
Apart from identification argument, Vertex has an array list of other vertices, which are also of 
the Vertex type. This way we know which vertex is adjacent to which one. Since the graph is 
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directed and acyclic, by its definition we only have edges from top to bottom, meaning that no 
role can point to user. Other restrictions/conditions are as follows. 
 A role can point to another role only if it is of lower level of hierarchy 
 A role can point to permissions 
 A user can point to roles 
 A user can point to permissions 
 
Apart from usual methods (constructor, setters and getters methods) Vertex class includes some 
other methods. We only emphasise the importance of addNeighbour() and 
removeNeighbour() mehods, which we use to add a new neighbour to the adjacency list of 
neighbours, or delete a neighbour vertex from the list. Both methods take Vertex as an input 
parameter, as a neighbour which is to be added or removed from array list of neighbours. Method 
getNeighbours() will return a List<Vertex> of all the neighbours for particular vertex. 
 
Classes that extend Vertex class have additional argument, which is string representation of id. 
RoleVertex class also includes integer argument level, which is used to represent a level in 
the graph (hierarchy) of the particular role. As we state in conditions, role can only point to 
another role if that other role has lower level of hierarchy; in this case that is argument level. 
PermissionVertex class has one distinction from other two classes that extend Vertex 
class. When we try to add or remove a neighbour to a permission vertex, method throws an 
exception since this is not valid scenario according to our conditions from above. 
 
Class interfaces of all four classes are shown in appendix A. 
 
Now that we explained all the components of graph we can move to explaining the graph 
structure and its implementation. We also explain the implementation of the SDP and the 





3.2. Secondary Decision Point (SDP) 
 
We show the SDP's class diagram in Figure 5. The attributes that we associate with an 
SDP are as follows: 
 
public ArrayList<Session> sessions; 
protected static int sdpId; 
public int id; 
public SDPDataStructure g;  




Figure 6 - SDP class diagram 
 
Apart from identifiers, each SDP has a number of sessions that are associated with it. It also 
includes the data structure that is specific for its implementation and the PDP with which it is 




public abstract void destroySession(int sessionId); 
public abstract int initiateSessionRequest(String userId, String[] roles); 
public abstract boolean accessRequest(int sessionId, int permissionId); 
 
The communication between the PDP and the SDP occurs through 
initiateSessionRequest() and destroySession(). As with the PDP, the SDP's 
methods are abstract. They are concretized by a particular data structure that we use at the SDP. 
A user invokes initiateSessionRequest() to initiate a new session. A user issues 
accessRequest() when he wants to exercise a permission within a session. A user invokes 
destroySession() to delete a session. 
 
Each of the SDP's array list of sessions is of type Session. It contains information about the user 
that initiated the session, an identifier for it, and array list of permissions that he wants to access. 
Permissions in RBAC are opaque [2]. Therefore, we have chosen to represent permissions as 
strings. Class diagram of Session class is shown below. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Session class diagram 
We have concretized the SDP with three different data structures. This is part of our validation 
for the abstraction that we discuss in Section 3.1.1. In the following sections, we discuss each 





3.2.1. Directed graph 
 
As we mention in the previous section our way of implementing directed graph is as an 
array list. We choose this particular implementation since the cost of updating the graph, which 
includes both deletion and adding an edge or vertex, is less than in matrix version of 
implementation. We leverage our implementation for a directed graph that we discuss in Section 
3.1.1. We explain the process of getting the graph structure that results at the SDP from our 
example sessions sa and sb (Chapter 1, Figure 2).  
When a session is activated, the PDP communicates to the SDP (Step 2 of Figure 3). Let 
 be the complete RBAC configuration at the PDP perceived as a directed graph. Let =
 { , … , } be the set of sessions that are active at a PEP, and =  , … ,  be the set of 
roles that are associated with the session si. Let =  { , … , } be the set of permissions that 
are reachable in   from the roles in ⋃ . Then the vertices of   are  ⋃  ⋃  ⋃… ⋃ . 
The edges of G are 〈  , 〉 ∶     ⋃ ( ) where E(I) is the set of edges of the subgraph I of 
  that is induced by the vertices in  ⋃  ⋃… ⋃ . That is, G is similar to a subgraph of , 
except with sessions in place of users, and the edges induced by the vertices that are relevant to 
the sessions.  
The access 〈  , 〉 is allowed if and only if the vertex p is reachable from s in G. We 
represent G as an adjacency list, which is a standard representation of a graph [11]. As an 
example, consider the sessions sa and sb from Section 1 for the RBAC policy in Figure 1. The 
session sa is activated by Alice and is associated with the role Software Engineer. The session sb 
is activated by Bob and is associated with the roles Software Engineer and IT Consultant. The 





Figure 8 - The directed graph for our example sessions sa and sb that are discussed in the text, for the RBAC policy in 
Chapter 1, Figure 2. 
 
SDPRbacGraph and PDPRbacGraph As we can see from the PDP and the SDP class diagrams 
(Figures 4 and 5), PDPRbacGraph and SDPRbacGraph are specializations of the PDP and 
the SDP classes. They inherit all the parent’s class methods and arguments. These specializations 
are necessary since we could have three different implementations of the PDP and the SDP.  
In next paragraphs we discuss implementation of the SDP where we use RbacGraph 
structure as its way of storing data.Class SDPRbacGraph is a daughter class to the SDP class 
(see Figure 5). Class PDPRbacGraph is a daughter class to the SDP class (see Figure 4). One 
of the modifications is additional argument, which contains the copy of the graph structure that is 
at the SDP. 
 
public ArrayList<Vertex> requested; 
 
Following the flow from Figure 3 (see Chapter 1), we have couple of steps in this process.  
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1. User comes and activates a session at the SDP. User sends initiation request to the SDP 
with its unique identifier and with a set of roles. Set of roles contains roles’ string 
identifiers. At this step we call following method from the SDP class. 
 
public int initiateSessionRequest(String userId, String[] roles); 
 
2. This step corresponds to a step 2 from Figure 3. At this point the SDP creates a new 
session for particular user and propagates a request to the PDP that is assigned to. We 
accomplish this by calling a method request() from PDP.  
 
public SDPDataStructure request(Session s, String[] roles); 
 
Now it is up to the PDP to check and see if a user is authorized to access roles from the 
set he sent. If this checking is successful, new structure of graph will be sent back to the 
SDP. The graph structure has one vertex at the top level, which represents the session, 
and all the role vertices that user had requested in middle levels. At the bottom level of a 
graph structure are all the permission vertices that are assigned to those role vertices. In 
the following paragraph we explain the algorithm for getting a new graph structure. 
Firstly we create a new vertex with a session identifier as our top level vertex in the 
response graph. Secondly, we get induced graph of the user that requested the session 
initiation. Next step is to go through all roles from the set and check for each of them if 
the user is assigned to them. If a user is not assigned to at least one of them, we return the 
NULL value as a response. This means that user has tried unauthorised access, the 
method returns an appropriate warning message. If a role is indeed assigned to a user, we 
merge the whole subgraph of that role with a response graph. This previous step is critical 
one. There is possibility when adding more roles’ subgraphs that some of them could 
duplicate in each other’s graphs. However we avoid this case since when we check a new 
role, we check if it is already in the response graph. Only in the case if a role is not in the 
response graph, we add it to a array list of vertices of a response graph. At the PDP we 
update the array list requested with newly requested vertices. When we check all the 




3. Now, when we create the session and update the graph structure at the SDP, user tries to 
send access request. User sends a request to access some permission within its session.  
 
public boolean accessRequest(int sessionId, int permissionId); 
 
This whole process is done at the SDP level so we do not communicate with the PDP. As 
we can see from accessRequest() method’s signature, user sends sessionId and 
permissionId. We check whether the particular session is authorized to perform a 
particular session in a following way. First we fetch the vertex that has sessionId as 
its identifier (if there is such, if not we return a warning message). Secondly, we go 
through vertex’s subgraph trying to find a permission vertex with has matching identifier 
with a given input argument. If we manage to accomplish all this, we return a TRUE 
value. This indicates that access request is approved. In any other case, whether the 
session is inexistent or permission is inexistent, we return a FALSE value indicating that 
access request is denied. If we take Figure 3 in consideration this step corresponds to 
steps 3, 4 and 5 from Figure 3. 
 
4. The session at the SDP can be destroyed or invalidated. This could have probably been 
implemented as a time dependent feature, but for the testing purposes we have made our 
implementation to look as follows.  
When we call a destroySession() method from the SDP we do following. The SDP 
automatically invokes delete method from the PDP. At the PDP the idea is to delete the 
session vertex and all other vertices from its subgraph. The only condition when we 
delete a vertex is that it is not assigned to any other vertex from the rest of the graph. We 
do not operate with the graph structure from the PDP but rather with array list requested 
which contains duplicate of the SDP’s graph structure. When we complete deletion, we 
send a new graph structure to the SDP as a response. The SDP will replace its graph 
structure with new one. Signatures of the delete() and destroySession() 
methods are shown below. 
 
public void destroySession(int sessionId); 
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public SDPDataStructure delete(int sessionId); 
 
3.2.2. Access Matrix 
 
The access matrix [9, 10] is yet another very natural candidate to be used as a structure at 
the SDP. It is canonical and intuitively appealing representation for an access control 
configuration [14]. The encoding of RBAC session in an access matrix is straightforward. Rows 
are indexed by sessions and columns by permissions. Our entity in a matrix is a bit. For example 
if a session i is assigned to certain permission j, than field of the matrix [i, j] is going to have 
value of bit 1, in other case it is going to be 0. In Table 1, We show the access matrix that results 
at the SDP from our example sessions sa and sb (Figure 2).  
 
 
 Project Planning Code Modification Project Review 
sa 1 1 0 
sb 1 1 1 
Table 1 - Access matrix for our example from Chapter 1, for the RBAC policy in Figure 2. 
 
Encoding of RBAC in Access Matrix RbacMatrix class implements RBAC, it has three 
attributes. First one is a matrix and another two are the dimension of matrix (corresponding to 
number of rows and columns). Interface of the RbacMatrix class is shown below. 
 
public class RbacMatrix implements RBAC { 
 
 public String [][] matrix; 
 int M, N; 
  
 public RbacMatrix(); 
 public RbacMatrix(int M, int N) {...} 
 public RbacMatrix(int M) {...} 
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 public boolean isPair(int a, int b) {...} 
} 
 
First constructor is an empty constructor, second one initializes matrix of MxN dimension with 
all default values (zeros). Third constructor initializes matrix of MxM dimension. In this last case 
both dimensions are the same, however we only have one input parameter. Method isPair()is 
used so we can check whether a particular session has permission to access the permission (since 
we said that rows stand for sessions and columns stand for permissions). The value that a method 
returns, depends on a field [a, b] of the matrix, from given input parameters a and b. If that field 
is within the range of the matrix, we check its value. If the value is 1 (one), method returns 
TRUE, otherwise FALSE. 
 
SDPAccessMatrix and PDPAccessMatrix The communication between the SDP and the PDP 
stays the same as mentioned before (see Section 3.1.1). The only difference is the way we 
implement methods at the PDP level since the returning data structure is now access matrix. 
Methods at the SDP are the same, except the implementation of the access request method. In 
this method we use previously mentioned isPair() method (Section 3.3.1.) from 
RbacMatrix class which simply checks whether certain session is allowed to perform 
particular permission. The methods of the SDPAccessMatrix are shown below. 
 
public int initiateSessionRequest(String userId, String[] roles); 
public boolean accessRequest(int sessionId, int permissionId); 
public void destroySession(int sessionId); 
 
All methods’ signatures are the same as before. However when it comes to the implementation of 
methods at the PDP, there are quite a few changes forth of mentioning. The interface of the 
PDPAccessMatrix class looks like this. 
 
public class PDPAccessMatrix extends PolicyDecisionPoint { 
  
 public ArrayList<RecordData> record; 
 public ArrayList<Integer> sessions; 
 public ArrayList<Integer> permissions;  
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public PDPAccessMatrix() {...}  
public SDPDataStructure request(Session s, String[] roles) {...} 
public SDPDataStructure delete(int sessionId) {...} 
public SDPDataStructure matrixCreate() {...} 
} 
 
We can notice that in this specialization of the PDP we have fields than we did not have 
in previous one (Section 3.2.3.). In order to keep track which session issues request for which set 
of permissions, we introduce array list of RecordData. We implement RecordData as a 
separate class. An instance of that class is a session’s integer identifier and an array list of 
permissions assigned to that session. The general idea is to make process of reconstructing a 
matrix as easy as possible. Apart from argument record, PDPAccessMatrix class has two 
more arguments, both of them are implemented as array lists. Argument sessions, we use to 
store all the sessions that have requested initiation at the SDP level.  Argument permissions, 
we used to store all the permissions the sessions have requested to access to. It is worth of 
mentioning that this array list has property of a set, there is no duplicating of permissions in it. 
The methods of PDPAccessMatrix class have the same signatures but the implementation is 
different.  
When we send the initiation request from the SDP, we expect a new data structure to be 
returned from the PDP. We assume that initiation request is allowed at the SDP level. We go 
through the graph at the PDP and we automatically create new a new instance or RecordData 
as we collect all the permissions that user has requested for. Having that and the new session’s 
identifier, we add a new instance of RecordData to an array list. At the same time we populate 
two other array lists, making sure that we do not end up having duplicates in any one of them. 
After all this is done we create and return new matrix to the SDP. We create a new using method 
matrixCreate(). This method picks the permission with largest integer identifier and the 
session with largest identifier assigning them to the dimensions of the matrix. It can be noticed 
that doing that we might end up with half empty matrix, e.g. permissions that have not been even 
requested but their integer identifier is smaller than the one we picked. However this is 
space/time trade off that is inevitable in matrix case. When we create an empty matrix, the next 
step is to go through an array list of RecordData and match the sessions with its permissions. 
This way we fill in the matrix with its values. For example, if an element of an array list has a 
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session identifier with value of M, and the list of permissions with values {i, i+1, i+2, ..., n}, then 
we set the following fields in a new matrix to value 1; [M, i], [M, i+1], [M, i+2], ..., [M, n]. 
 When it comes to deleting a session, the SDP calls for the delete() method at the 
PDP. There are two cases in this. 
1. Session we try to delete is the last row in the matrix 
2. Session we try to delete is not the last row in the matrix 
 
In both cases we delete particular session from both record and sessions array list. 
However in the first we case reduce matrix’s row count by one and then recreate new matrix 
which we send as back to the SDP. Reconstructing a new matrix in the second case is done fast. 
The ordering of the columns and rows does not change, we simply delete the last element from 
the sessions and record array list, no reordering of the columns’ and rows’ indexes is 
necessary. In the second case after updating array list structures we return a NULL value. 
Returning NULL value signals to the SDP that it can just do invalidation of that session’s row. 
All the values for that row will be set to 0 (zero). This way we do not reconstruct a matrix, but 
we will have unused space. We could do this in the first case as well, without going to the PDP 
and reconstructing a new matrix.  
It is worth to mention that in this approach we are facing space/time trade off. We can see 
that access checking is constant, but the price we have to pay is that we have to store potentially 




 CPOL [6] is an approach to distributed access enforcement that has been proposed in the 
context of trust management. In trust management, the configuration (or policy) is distributed as 
well. Also, the syntax of polices is different from RBAC. Consequently, we need to provide an 
encoding of RBAC sessions in CPOL. 
 In CPOL, an AccessToken is used to determine whether access should be granted or not. 
In the original design [6], an AccessToken is opaque – its structure is specific to an application. 
A policy comprises Rules; each Rule contains an AccessToken. To check whether an access 
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should be approved, we need to check the set of Rules and whether any of them contains 
particular AccessToken that will grant an access. 
 
Encoding of RBAC in CPOL Our encoding of RBAC in CPOL is as follows; we argue that this 
is the most natural encoding. We implement the SDP as a CPOL Cache [14]. Implementing a 
cache is one of the crucial things for CPOL performance, and that is why we want this to be as 
good as possible and close to original implementation in C++. Cache contains an array list of 
cache entries (CacheEntry.java). Cache entry contains CacheKey, an AccessToken and condition 
(which is Boolean type). We represent CacheKey as an integer sessionId. AccessToken is a set 
of permissions to which session is authorized [14]. Our study of the original CPOL 
implementation suggests that a manner in which a set of permissions should be implemented is 
of big importance for CPOL performances. We used Java library java.util.set to represent a set of 
permissions. In  Appendix B we show all the classes within Cpol package. Figure 9 shows class 





Figure 9 - Cpol package class diagram 
 Class Rule.java is basically mapping of a Session as it is in other implementations 
(Sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2.). To simplify this mapping we introduced a new class 
SessionCPOL, which extends Session class. As an only field, SessionCPOL class, 
contains Rule. We can now see the mapping with the Session more clearly and more logical. 
When implementing each class, we take care that it becomes worthy duplicate of its original 
implementation. Rule contains following fields; owner, licencee, accesstoken and condition. 
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Owner, which is type of String, is unused in our process of evaluation, and since it is used only 
by a system itself, we say that system is the owner. In our implementation we use licencee to 
represent userId. Licencee is a type of String. Since we map Rule to the Session, the only natural 
thing is for licencee to be userId. AccessToken is type of AccessToken, which is described 
above. Field condition is type of Boolean, and it is used to say whether a particular Rule is valid 
or not. 
 In our example of the sessions sa and sb from the RBAC policy (see Chapter 1, Figure 2), 
we have two CPOL Rules, Rulea and Ruleb, which contain AccessTokena and AccessTokenb 
respectively. AccessTokena is {Project Planning, Code Modification}. AccessTokenb is {Projec 
Planning, Code Modification, Project Review}. The cache has keys sa and sb, for the two access 
tokens. [14]  
 
SDPCPOL and PDPCPOL — The communication between the SDP and the PDP stays the same 
as mentioned before (see Section 3.1.1). Signatures of the SDP’s methods stay unchanged as 
before, but their implementation defers from previous ones as expected. We show interface of 
SDPCPOL below. 
 
public class SDPCPOL extends SecondaryDecisionPoint { 
  
 public Cache cache; 
 public ArrayList<SessionCPOL> sessions;  
  
public SDPCPOL(PolicyDecisionPoint pdp) {...}  
public int initiateSessionRequest(String userId, String[] roles); 
public boolean accessRequest(int sessionId, int permissionId); 




As mentioned before this instance of the SDP is implemented as a cache. At the SDP level we 
store Cache which has multiple CacheEntries and an array list of sessions, which are type of 
SessionCPOL. This list has actually properties of set, since there could not be two same Rules, 
therefore nor could exist two same SessionCPOL. This is exactly what we had mentioned in 
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previous section; in order to check whether a particular access should be approved, we check the 
set of Rules to determine if some contains an AccessToken. The other way of checking this is to 
go through a Cache, which is a keyed table, and as soon as we hit the requested entry we check 
whether an AccessToken within contains particular permissionId. This is however the way we do 
it in our implementation since the access request when issued has two parameters; sessionId and 
permissionId. When a session is to be deleted; we do this in two steps; first step is to invalidate 
entry with the key that is equal to sessionId, and the second step is to remove the rule that has 
been created for particular session. The way we did step three is very intuitive, we simply iterate 
through list of SessionCPOL and when we find a match we remove it from a list. At this point 
no communication with the PDP is required. However since we also keep copy of all the Rules at 
the PDP, we will invoke delete method from the PDP, so that the PDP updates its list as well. 
When a session initiation request is issued, we do next steps. First step is to create new instances 
of Rule and SessionCPOL of input parameters of the method. After this is completed we send 
a request to the PDP with new SessionCPOL and set of roles, as parameters. If all is in order 
(there is no violation of access of any kind), the PDP should return a new CacheEntry to the 
SDP. Newly created instance of Rule is being updated with AccessToken from new CacheEntry, 
and its condition is set to TRUE. After doing so, Rule is being assigned to a new instance of 
SessionCPOL. Finally both new CacheEntry and SessionCPOL are added to their lists, and so 
session initiation is being successful.  
 At the PDPCPOL, we have two methods; request and delete. First one is invoked by the 
SDP when there is an initiation of a session, second one when a session is to be deleted. As 
mentioned before, we keep array list of Rules at the SDP level as well. However instead of 
having the whole Rule structure we keep only its id at this level. When the user is identified, and 
when we make sure that all the roles he requested, he can access to, we will form a list of 
permissions. From a input parameter we extract a Rule’s id which will be placed in a list of 
Rules at the PDP. After all this is done successfully, we create new AccessToken, CacheKey 
(key itself is Rule’s id) and new CacheEntry, that is to be returned as a response to the SDP. If 
anything goes wrong, NULL value will be returned. Second method is delete method, which we 
invoke by the SDP when we want to delete a session. This method is mapping to a 
removeRule() method from original Cpol implementation [6]. Since Session is mapped to a 




In our implementation of CPOL, we have adhered closely to the original implementation. 
In a Chapter 4, we discuss why we have based our assessment on a new implementation. Our 






4.1. Benchmark  
 
In this chapter we explain how using existing architecture that we developed, we can 
evaluate different implementations of access enforcement in RBAC. Doing this we wish to 
determine whether our platform is sound and independent of any possible data structures that 
might be used at the SDP level. Firstly we would like to describe the benchmark we used. 
Benchmark has two components: RBAC polices [29] and session profiles [14]. We have 
designed and implemented programs to generate data sets for the benchmark [14]. The programs 
are written in Java. Each one of them takes certain arguments that correspond to the 
categorizations we discuss in next sections. 
 
4.1.1. RBAC Profiles 
 
The RBAC policies that comprise our benchmark are from prior research in RBAC, and 
experience with RBAC deployments that have been documented in books and the research 
literature. We present a summary in Table 2. We categorize RBAC policies along the following 
axes. 












































Table 2 - Categorization of RBAC polices in the benchmark. 
Source We have two sources, “Literature”, and “Synthetic”. By Literature, we mean that we have 
directly acquired particular kinds of policies from literature that documents research and 
experience with RBAC. Our sources for these can be classified into three. 
1. Top —down design of RBAC polices [3, 15, 16, 17] 
2. Role mining and engineering [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] 
3. Evaluation of approaches to access-enforcement [4, 5, 8] 
We also have created some new kinds of policies based on policies from the literature. We call 
these Synthetic policies. 
Number of users, roles and permissions The numbers of users, roles and permissions are 
typically co-dependant in RBAC policies from the literature. In Table 2, we show the number of 
users, and the corresponding numbers of roles and permissions for policies from the literature, 
and for Synthetic policies. We point out that roles do not grow, for example, linearly, with users, 
but more as a step function.  
We point out also that the number of permissions range from a fraction of the number of 
users, to a somewhat significant multiple. The reason for this range is that RBAC is deployed in 
one of two contexts. One is for high-level policies in which permissions are abstract. Another is 
at a much lower level, in which resources that are protected are individual files or email 
messages; in such systems, there can be a considerable number of permissions. (It is common for 
a permission to be a pair 〈 , 〉, where o is the object or resource that is protected, and r is a 
privilege or right. However, this is not the only encoding as a permission that is meaningful; see, 
for example, the work of Crampton [26].)  
For our Synthetic policies, we consider numbers for typical enterprises that we have not 
already considered under Literature. The number of employees of an enterprise can be up to 1.6 
million [12]. If such enterprises deploy RBAC, we anticipate that they will want to model each 
employee as an RBAC user. For such policies, we anticipate that the number of roles will be in 
the same proportion to the number of users as for the largest range for users from the literature. 
We do not anticipate that the number of permissions will increase significantly. Consequently, 




Role hierarchy (RH) and connectivity  There are three categories we consider for the structure of 
RBAC policies. As Table 2 indicates, these are RH Depth, RH Model and Connectivity. By RH 
Depth, we mean the maximum path-length from a role to a permission. In our survey of the 
literature, the RH Depth does not exceed 5. 
We consider two RH Models, Stanford and Hybrid. In the Stanford model [3], roles are 
layered, and a role at layer i directly inherits roles only in layer i + 1, and is inherited directly 
only by roles in layer i - 1 (or by users, for the topmost layer of roles). The Stanford model arises 
in the top-down design of RBAC policies. Realizing the Stanford model in an enterprise 
typically results in 4 or 5 layers of roles [3]. The hybrid model arises in both the top-down design 
of RBAC policies and in role mining. In the hybrid model, the role hierarchy is some partial 
ordering, and not layered as in the Stanford model. A special case of the two models is when 
there is no role-role relationship. This is called Core RBAC and arises in role mining [8, 21]. 
 
4.1.2. Session profiles 
 
There is some prior work which has datasets on session profiles [5, 8, 13]. We augment 
those datasets with our own. We categorized session profiles into two; activation and access 




o Number of roles 
o Number of permissions 
o Nature of roles 
o Nature of permissions 
 Inter-session 
o Number of sessions 




Table 3- Session profile categories in our benchmark. 
30 
 
Under activation category, we consider attributes associated with activation of session. For intra-
session we have four arguments. Number of roles represents how many roles we would like to 
activate. This could be a fixed number or a range. Number of permissions is number of how 
many permissions we want to access. When we talk about nature of roles, there is quite a few 
ways this one is used. For example we may specify that only roles that are directly assigned to 
user are activated. Another would be that only roles that activate same sets of permissions are 
activated. This is also referred as separation-of-duty [3]. Nature of permissions gives us option to 
choose whether to activate only permissions user is assigned to, or rather any permission from 
the system. 
For inter-session we have two attributes. Number of session represents exactly number of 
sessions we would like to activate. The other one, arrival rate, is the kind of arrival we would 
like our session activations to show up in the system. We consider bursty and uniform arrival 
rate. By bursty arrival, we mean that session activations are interspersed with relatively long 
“quiet” periods in which we have no session activations. In between those activations, we have 
access checks for the existing sessions [14]. In uniform session arrivals, session activations are 
uniformly interspersed with access checks [14]. We conclude that bursty arrivals are more likely 
sessions directly used by humans, and on the other side, uniform arrivals would be possible for 
automated processes which activate the sessions. 
Our second category is relates to access checks. Here we have two attributes: the number and the 
nature of access checks. First one represents the actual number of sessions we would like to 
activate. Under nature of access checks, we characterize the permissions for which access checks 
needs to be made. For example one way is to perform all the access checks to all of permissions, 
until we reach the number of access check. The other way is to perform access checks only to 
permissions that are allowed for a user. 
 
4.2. Evaluation and methodology 
 
In next section we will talk about performance of three different approaches against our 






Meaningful empirical assessment is a significant challenge in computing. For Java 
programs, non-determinism in making empirical observations can result from various factors, 
such as dynamic compilation and garbage collection. The methodology we adopt overcomes 
such non-determinism and is statistically rigorous. It is based on the work of Georges et al.[27]. 
Java programs run within an instance of a Virtual Machine (VM). We collect the average 
time across multiple VM invocations, as there can be variation across such invocations. Within a 
VM invocation, we need to avoid skew from the effects of starting up the VM and reach what is 
called steady-state [27]. For each VM invocation, we determine the number of benchmark 
iterations that we need to perform by finding at least k consecutive steady-state values for which 
the coefficient of variation (CoV) is less than some preset value (we have chosen 2%). The value 
of k starts at some value (4, in our case) and increases so long as the CoV decreases, upto the 
threshold. We record the mean of the k values for each VM invocation. Our final benchmark 
time is the mean across all VM invocations. 
To minimize the effects from garbage collection, we keep the heap size constant across 
VM invocations. Apart from the mean, we also compute confidence intervals. Our objective is 
for the confidence intervals to not overlap, as then, with a certain confidence (95%, in our case), 
we can assert that the two values are statistically distinct. All the values we report and graph in 
this paper are statistically distinct from other values. 
We have conducted our experiments on an isolated Intel dual core E8400 PC that runs at 
3 GHz, has 3.5 Gbytes of RAM and runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system. Our Java version is 




Time efficiency For time efficiency we consider both inter-, and intra-session profiles. We have 
two inter-session attributes: the number of sessions, and the arrival rate. In Table 4 and Figures 
10, 11 and 12, we present our results for time efficiency, with the inter-session attributes as 
parameters. We also consider an intra-session attribute, the nature of RH. We discuss the results 
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that pertain to that in the next section. In each dataset we have 2500 users, each authorized to 
different numbers of roles and permissions. We have 100 roles in total, and 100 permissions. Our 
objective is to understand the behaviour of each approach as the two inter-session attributes 
change. Consequently, we consider from 2 through 15 sessions, and both bursty and uniform 
arrivals for the sessions. There are several observations we make from our results. 
 
Arrival rates We observe from Table 4 that none of the approaches is impacted by the session 
arrival rate (burst vs. uniform).  
 
Number of sessions The graphs in Figures 10, 11 and 12 show the impact of the number of 
sessions on each of three approaches. We observe that all three approaches are resilient to an 
increase in the number of sessions from the standpoint of time efficiency. That is, access check 
time does not necessarily grow with the number of sessions. We expect this to be the case, so 
long as the PEP/SDP is not stressed by adding too many sessions. None of the approaches has an 
access check algorithm whose time-complexity is parameterized by the number of sessions. 
It is not our objective to stress a PEP/SDP by considering large numbers of sessions. 
Indeed, the number of sessions a PEP/SDP can support without significant impact on its 
performance depends on its resources such as hardware. Our objective is gain broader insights 
into the three approaches, notwithstanding the resources available to a PEP/SDP, assuming some 
realistic model of computation (the “Random-Access Machine” model, for example [11]). 
 
Efficiency The access matrix is very time-efficient; in our tests, an access check takes less than 1 
µs. This is unsurprising as an access check is done in constant time with minimal additional 
overhead. CPOL is only slightly less efficient; for this particular dataset, we can perceive the 
number of permissions to which a session is authorized as constant. Consequently, the manner in 
which a CPOL AccessToken is realized does not impact time-efficiency. The directed graph is 
highly efficient for Core RBAC. This is because a path from a session vertex to a permission 
vertex is exactly 2; consequently, it is highly efficient when we have only up to a few hundred 
roles. We study the impact on time efficiency from intra-session attributes (e.g., a large number 




Jitter By jitter, we mean the variation in access check times as the number of sessions changes. 
We can quantify this as the percentage error in the mean; that is, the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean. We observe from Figures 10, 11 and 12 that this is quite small for the 
directed graph, access matrix and CPOL. In our datasets, a user is directly assigned to the same 
number of roles across each of the Stanford, Hybrid and Core policies. Consequently, there is 
more heterogeneity in the roles that a user may activate in the Stanford policy than in the other 
two. 
 
  Directed graph Access matrix CPOL 
 
Bursty 
Stanford 32.70 0.79 2.14 
Hybrid 9.41 0.80 3.12 
Core 5.17 0.74 2.87 
 
Uniform 
Stanford 29.47 0.62 1.50 
Hybrid 8.45 0.62 1.44 
Core 5.93 0.60 1.51 
Table 4 - Average access check times in µs with the inter-session attributes, and one intra-session attribute (nature of 
RH), as parameters. 
 
We have studied the impact of intra-session attributes on time-efficiency. We vary three 
parameters in our experiments in this context: the number of roles per session, the number of 
permissions per session and the nature of RH (Stanford, Hybrid and Core). Figures 10, 11 and 12 
shows the impact of the last attribute on time efficiency, and Figures 13, 14 shows average 
access check times in µs for Core RBAC, for which the number of roles and permissions range 
from small (10) to large (10,000). Such numbers are consistent with Table 2. 
 
Role hierarchy Table 4 and the graphs in Figures 10, 11 and 12 show the impact of Stanford vs. 
Hybrid vs. Core as the choice for RH. Only for the directed graph do we see an impact from the 
choice of RH. For the directed graph, a deeper RH results in an increased access check time as 
we need to traverse a longer path from a session vertex to a permission vertex. This is reflective 
of our dataset — a user is directly assigned to the same number of roles for all three of the 
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Stanford, Hybrid and Core RBAC policies. However, in the Stanford policy, he is authorized to 
more roles as a result of the deep RH.  
 
Scalability We observe from Figure 13 that the directed graph scales poorly as we increase the 
number of roles. The reason is that access checking for the directed graph is vertex reachability, 
which is linear in the size of the graph. For the access matrix and CPOL, the time for access 
checking is independent of the number of roles in a session. In this respect, they scale well with 
the number of roles. 
The access matrix and CPOL scale well also with the number of permissions, as Figure 
14 indicates. This is somewhat surprising as an AccessToken in CPOL is linear in the number of 
permissions in a session. As we mention earlier, it is crucial to the time efficiency of CPOL that 
this encoding be efficient. Notwithstanding this, up to 10,000 permissions, these issues appear to 
have no tangible impact on the time efficiency of these approaches. The directed graph fares 
poorly in this context as well. This is because the adjacency list approach often requires a linear 
search to find a vertex (permission, in this case).  
 
 




Figure 11 - Average access check time in µs and the corresponding standard deviation for access matrix. 
 




Figure 13 – Time efficiency for small (10) to large (10,000) numbers of roles in a session. 
 
 




Space efficiency In this section, we analyze the space-efficiency of the three approaches. We 
base our assessment on what we have observed from our implementations, and an analysis of the 
data structures. The space needed for a directed graph grows linearly with the number of 
sessions. In the worst-case, it can also grow linearly with the number of permissions and roles 
per session. However, on average, the size of the directed graph is constant in the number of 
permissions and roles. This is because we expect roles and permissions to be shared by several 
sessions. 
The access matrix is highly space inefficient. The reason is that it grows quadratically 
with the number of sessions and the number of permissions to which any session is authorized. 
CPOL is linear in the number of sessions. It is linear also in the number of permissions per 
session, and therefore not as space efficient as the directed graph. It is agnostic to the number of 
roles in a session. In Figures 15, we present graphs that capture the above discussion. The graphs 
have been generated based on our implementations. The reason the access matrix is highly 
space-efficient for small numbers of sessions is that it is a bit matrix. However, as the number of 
sessions and permissions per sessions grow, its (quadratic) growth quickly negates the fact that 





Figure 15 – The space efficiency of our approaches. In our data set that we used to generate this graph, the number of 
roles and permissions grows by a constant factor per session. We show that access matrix and CPOL are space inefficient, 
while directed graph is space efficient. 
 
Administrative efficiency An administrative change is the addition or deletion of a user-role, role-
role or permission-role relationship in an RBAC policy. The addition of a user at the PDP has no 
impact on an SDP. However, the removal of a user may impact an SDP, as that user's sessions 
need to be removed. This impact is linear in the number of sessions in the worst case for the 
directed graph, quadratic in the number of sessions and permissions in the worst case for the 
access matrix and linear in the number of sessions in the worst case for CPOL. 
The addition or removal of a permission can impact an SDP. The impact is constant-time 
for the directed graph, linear in the worst case in the number of sessions for the access matrix 
and linear in the number of sessions for CPOL. The addition or removal of a role can authorize 
or forbid a session, respectively, to several permissions. We can infer the impact on the three 
approaches from our discussions on permissions. 
In Table 5, we show the results of a proportional mix of administrative changes. The 
research literature on RBAC administration has focussed mostly on user-role changes, 
presumably because these are the most frequent in real-world deployments. We assume that 75% 
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of the changes are to user-role relationships. We conjecture that permission-role changes are the 
next most frequent (20%) and changes to roles are infrequent (5%). In our experiments, sessions 
overlap with one another in terms of permissions and roles to a constant factor. 
 
 Directed graph Access matrix CPOL 
100 13.45 2934.00 321.75 
200 22.20 9003.60 1644.00 
300 39.15 1741.05 5439.30 
400 45.80 3748.80 5053.00 
500 38.50 25097.25 12567.25 
600 87.30 20488.20 3492.00 
700 108.85 18676.70 1737.05 
800 142.00 33686.40 7352.00 
900 151.65 17543.25 17145.00 
1000 158.50 31068.00 6800.00 
Table 5 - The administrative overhead on a Core RBAC policy. We assume a proportion of 75% changes to user-role 
relationships, 20% to role-permission relationships, and 5% to role-role relationships. The number of sessions is 1000, 
and every user has at least one session. 
From the results from Table 6, we can see that the size of RBAC plays important role. 
For example, if the deployment is small in the size of the RBAC policy (e.g., only up to 100's of 
roles and permissions), then the access matrix is the best choice. However, if the deployment 
gets larger, then space and time efficiency gives poor results for access matrix. CPOL has the 
same scenario. While it performs good in terms of access checking times, it fails when it comes 
to administration and space efficiency considerations. If there is a need for balance reasonable 
space and access check time with ease of administration, then the directed graph is a good 
choice. 
We have assessed the three approaches to distributed access enforcement in RBAC. Our 
approach is empirical, and we have proposed and used a benchmark as the basis. Based on our 
quantitative results, we are able to provide guidance on the best approach from among the three 




  Directed graph Access matrix CPOL 
Time 
Inter-session fair good good 
Intra-session poor good good 
Space fair poor poor 
Admin good poor poor 
Table 6 - Our rating of "good", "fair", "poor" for each approach that we assess. While we argue that these ratings follow 







 We have designed and implemented a platform for assessing distributed access 
enforcement in RBAC. We have validated it by using it to assess three approaches, one of which 
is CPOL [6], the state of the art in distributed access enforcement. Our assessment has provided a 
somewhat surprising result that CPOL is not necessarily the best choice for access enforcement 
in settings that are typical for RBAC.  
 In future work, we plan to explore the use of our platform for assessing approaches to 
access enforcement in contexts other then RBAC, such as trust management. Also, we plan to 
explore new trust models between the PDP and the SDP. We may perceive the PDP as 
outsourcing access enforcement to the SDP, but not fully trusting the SDP to, for example, keep 
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public abstract class Vertex { 
 public static int staticId; 
 public int id; 
 public ArrayList<Vertex> neighbours; 
 public Vertex() {...} 
 public int getId() {...} 
 public void addNeighbour(Vertex v) {...} 
 public void removeNeighbour(Vertex v) {...} 
 public List<Vertex> getNeighbours() {...} 
 public int getNumNeighbours() {...} 
 public Vertex getNeighbour(int i) {...} 
 public abstract String getStringId(); 
} 
public class UserVertex extends Vertex { 
 private String userId; 
 public String getUserId() {...} 
 public String getStringId() {...} 
 public UserVertex(String userId) {...} 
} 
public class RoleVertex extends Vertex { 
 public int level;  
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 private String roleId; 
 public RoleVertex(String roleId) {...} 
 public int getLevel() {...} 
 public void setLevel(int level) {...} 
 public String getRoleId() {...} 
 public String getStringId() {...} 
 public String getRoleType() {...} 
} 
public class PermissionVertex extends Vertex { 
 private String permissionId; 
 public String getPermissionId(){...} 
 public String getStringId(){...} 
 public PermissionVertex(String permissionId) {...} 
 public void addNeighbour(Vertex v) {...} 








public class SessionCPOL extends Session { 
 public Rule rule; 
 public SessionCPOL(Rule rule) {...} 
 public Rule getRule() {...} 
 public void setRule(Rule rule) {...} 
} 
public class Rule { 
 public static int ruleId; 
 public int id;  
 public String owner;  
 public String licencee;  
 public AccessToken accesstoken; 
 public boolean condition; 
 public Rule(String sessionId) {...} 
 public Rule(String sessionId, AccessToken A) {...} 
 public Rule(int id, String owner, String licence, AccessToken 
accessToken, boolean condition) {...} 
 public void AddRule(int requester, String owner, String licence, 
AccessToken accessToken, boolean condition) {...} 
 public boolean removeRule() {...} 
 public int getId() {...} 
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 public void setId(int id) {...} 
 public String getLicencee() {...} 
 public void setLicencee(String licencee) {...} 
 public AccessToken getAccesstoken() {...} 
 public void setAccesstoken(AccessToken accessToken) {...} 
 public boolean getCondition() {...} 
 public void setCondition(boolean condition) {...} 
 public String getOwner() {...} 
 public void setOwner(String owner) {...} 
} 
 
public class Cache { 
 public ArrayList<CacheEntry> cache; 
 public Cache() {...} 
 public Cache(ArrayList<CacheEntry> cache) {...} 
 public ArrayList<CacheEntry> getCache() {...} 
 public void setCache(ArrayList<CacheEntry> cache) {...} 
 public void addEntry(CacheEntry entry) {...} 
 public void removeEntry(CacheEntry entry) {...} 
 public void invalidateEntry(int sessionId) {...} 
 public boolean isEntry(int sessionId, int permissionId) {...} 
} 
public class CacheEntry implements SDPDataStructure { 
 public CacheKey key; 
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 public AccessToken accessToken; 
 public boolean condition; 
 public CacheEntry(CacheKey key, AccessToken accesToken) {...} 
 public CacheKey getKey() {...} 
 public void setKey(int key) {...} 
 public AccessToken getA() {...} 
 public void setA(AccessToken accessToken) {...} 
 public boolean getCondition() {...} 




public class CacheKey { 
 public int sessionId; 
 public CacheKey(int key) {...} 
 public int getKey() {...} 
 public void setKey(int key) {...} 
} 
public class AccessToken { 
 public Set permissions; 
 public AccessToken() {...} 
 public AccessToken(Set permissions) {...} 
 public Set getPermissions() {...} 
 public void setPermissions(Set permissions) {...} 
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 public boolean checkPermission(int permissionId) {...}  
 public void add(AccessToken accessToken) {...} 
} 
